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Land, Technical Progress and
the Falling Rate of Pro6t
Howard Petith1
Universitat Aut,noma de 0arcelona
July 2006
??????????????????????????????

The paper sets out a one sector growth model with a neoclassical
production function in land and a capital-labour aggregate. If the elas-
ticity of substitution between land and the capital-labour aggregate is
less than one and if the rate of capital augmenting technical progress
is strictly positive, then the rate of pro6t will fall to zero. This result
holds regardless of the rate of land augmenting technical progress: no
amount of technical advance in agriculture can stop the fall in the rate
of pro6t. The paper also discusses the relation of this result to the
classical and Marxist literature.
3EL classi6cation: B24, E11, O41.
7ey 9ords: Marx, classical economics, the falling rate of pro6t.
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 
This paper is basically about the falling rate of pro6t. It develops an
essentially neoclassical growth model with land, labour and capital as
factors of production. Capital accumulates through capitalist savings,
the labour supply is in6nitely elastic at a subsistence wage and all fac-
tors experience factor augmenting technical progress. The result is that
if the elasticity of substitution between land and a capital-labour ag-
gregate is less than one and if the rate of technical progress experienced
by capital is positive, then the capital-labour ratio rises toward in6nity,
the share of capital approaches one and the rate of pro6t falls toward
zero. This result holds regardless of the speed of technical progress that
land experiences. Surprisingly, technical advance in agriculture cannot
halt the fall of the rate of pro6t.
This introduction discusses the relation of the result of the paper
to the classical and Marxist literature.With respect to the classical
literature, the conclusions, but not the logic, of the classical authors are
supported against those of modern writers. With respect to the Marxist
literature, the falling rate of pro6t is decoupled from rising wages and
a coherent way of linking this concept with Marxs overall view of
the future of capitalism is provided. Finally the paradoxical relation
between the result of this paper and a particular induced innovation
mechanism is underlined.
As a bench mark for the classical case, it is convenient to start
with a simpli6ed version of the "corn model" with technical progress in
agriculture: the production of corn is constant returns to scale in labour
and homogenous land. Capitalists rent land from landlords, paying the
marginal product of land after the harvest has been collected and hire
labor, paying in advance with their accumulated stock of corn. They
save a portion of their pro6ts which becomes zero when the rate of
pro6t reaches its minimum level. The labor force grows only when the
wage is above subsistence. At each moment the wage is determined
so that the entire stock of corn is used to pay wages. The classical
model, when stripped of its frills2, corresponds to this corn model. One
of the main conclusions of the classical school is that the equilibrium
of this model will approach a stationary state with the rate of pro6t
at a minimum, the wage at subsistence and no growth. Now add land
augmenting technical progress. With the intuition of the neoclassical
growth model, one sees that this model has a steady state in which the
rate of pro6t is above the minimum level, the wage is above subsistence,
2 One of the frills is non-homogenous land and rent. This is important for dis-
tribution but not relevant for the falling rate of pro6t and the approach to the
stationary state.
   
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and output, labour and the stock of corn grow at the rate of technical
progress3. That is, once land augmenting technical progress is added
to the classical model, its equilibrium does not approach the stationary
state.
In the light of this, consider the positions of David Ricardo and
John Stuart Mill on the falling rate of pro6t and the approach to the
stationary state in the presence of technical progress. Ricardo (1817, p.
120) stated,
The natural tendency of pro6ts then is to fall; for...the additional
quantity of food required is obtained by the sacri6ce of more and
more labour. This tendency...is happily checked at repeated inter-
vals by improvements in machinery connected with the production
of necessaries, as well as by discoveries in the science of agricul-
ture...which enable us to lower the price of the prime necessaries
of the labourer. But the rise ...in the wages is, however, limited;
for as soon as wages should be equal...to...the whole receipts of the
farmer, there must be an end to accumulation;...
The common interpretation of this has been that technical progress will
only slow the fall of the rate of pro6t. For example Eltis (1988, p. 278),
in the New Palgrave, writes of Ricardo that technical progress "...re-
duces the rate at which pro6ts decline, without agecting the proposition
that they must fall eventually to the minimum stationary level." Mill
(1965, p. 743) also considered the same issues. He concluded
All improvements, therefore, in production of almost any com-
modity, tend to widen the interval which has to be passed before
arriving at the stationary state.
Again the common interpretation is as with Ricardo. According to Eltis
(1988, p. 279) "...Mill did not envisage that technical progress...would
be suhcient to overcome the iniuence of population growth and agri-
cultural diminishing returns so pro6ts would continually fall towards
(the minimum level)". Thus, if one takes the corn model as the basis
for classical thinking, it must be concluded that Ricardo and Mill
did not understand that if there is any technical progress at all, the
economy will never arrive at the stationary state and the rate of pro6t
and the wage will be forever above their minimum levels. This lack of
understanding, to my knowledge, has not been pointed out before.
Now turn to the modern treatments of technical progress in the
context of the lassical model: Johansen (1967) and Samuelson (1976).
Both of these authors have the classical labour markets and capitalist
behavior. Their models diger mainly in production since both have
3 This is con6rmed by the work of modern authors cited below
   
Page 3 of 20 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
4
neoclassical capital rather than corn as an argument in their produc-
tion functions. This is important because it allows for the possibility
of capital augmenting technical progress. Speci6cally Johansen has a
Cobb-Douglas production function in a capital-labor aggregate and
land and capital augmenting technical progress while Samuelson has
a general neoclassical production function in the same arguments and
land augmenting technical progress. Both authors show that their mod-
els exhibit steady states with the rate of pro6t above the minimum level,
the wage above subsistence and positive growth. They then state that
their results corroborate those of the classical authors. This gives rise
to two questions. First, how can these results corroborate those of the
classical authors when they are exactly the contrary? And second, how
can these models, which are similar to the present model, have a steady
state with the rate of pro6t above its minimum level?
In respect to the 6rst question Johansens justi6cation (p. 21) is that
In the classical writings one can 6nd some suggestions about tech-
nical progress postponing stagnation, perhaps for an in6nite fu-
ture.
Samuelson (p. 1416) notes,
Mill went on to emphasize that technical innovation, continued in
the long-run steady state, would imply risi g output forever, we
can show on Mills behalf that, if there is land augmenting tech-
nical progress at a steady exponential rate (the above described
stationary state will occur).
No references for these justi6cations are given and, in any case, they
do not hold water. With respect to Johansen, it might be the case that
there are suggestions, but his results contradict the basic beliefs of the
classical economists. The situation is even worse with Samuelson. He
says "On Mills behalf" and then goes on to demonstrate that Mills
understanding of the future was wrong. I think that what happened was
that these authors were more interested in drawing the logical conse-
quences of the classical assumptions rather than engaging in a detailed
analysis of whether the classical economists correctly understood all
the implications of their assumptions.
In respect to the second question, it is certainly true that for general
models of this type the rate of pro6t will fall to its minimum level. What
happened in the two cited cases is that the authors chose accidentally,
and without justi6cation, the two special cases where this does not hap-
pen: Johansen has a unitary elasticity of substitution while Samuelson
has no capital augmenting technical progress.
With respect to the classical literature the contribution of this paper
is two fold: 6rst it shows that the conclusions of the modern writers are
   
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not correct generally, and second, it shows that if one takes the model
with neoclassical capital as the basis for classical thinking, then these
authors, although they were unaware of the necessary reasoning, had
accidently reached the generally correct conclusion.
I think that the result has implications beyond the characteristics of
the classical model. It would seem that most economists, if asked why
the rate of pro6t has not consistently fallen, would point to the rapid
technical progress in agriculture. Eltis (p.280) states
...technical progress has raised productivity enormously in both
industry and agriculture and there has been no tendency for a
rising relative cost of food to squeeze pro6ts in the manner that
Ricardo and Mill expected.
It may be true that the rate of pro6t has not fallen consistently, but
the result of this paper implies that this can not be attributed to rapid
progress in agriculture and is, thus, rather mysterious.
With regard to the Marxist literature, in the 6rst place Marxs
central idea is well-known: He thought that capitalism would fall and
be replaced by socialism. He further held that capitalist development
would be characterized by the following "historical tendencies": A rising
capital-labour ratio, a rising share of capital and a falling rate of pro6t.
In addition he seems to have initially thought that the wage would stay
at subsistence but later changed his mind about this. These tendencies
play important roles in Marxs various theories (never well worked out)
of the end of capitalism4. However the focus of interest has been on
Marxs theory of the falling rate of pro6t.
Marx thought that, in a temporary fashion, a shortage of labour
could cause the wage to rise and the rate of pro6t to fall, but that the
long run fall in the rate of pro6t would be due to 6rms choosing progres-
sively more capital intensive means of production5. This dichotomy has
given rise to two distinct "lines of thought". The 6rst, which is loosely
connected with the idea of the pro6t squeeze, attempts to explain the
4 The phrase "historical tendencies" was coined by Dume^nil and Le^vy (2003).
Their list is slightly longer than the one given above. They emphasize that a constant
share of capital is also consistent with Marxs writing. I have abbreviated the list
and chosen the rising share of capital because these are the tendencies that carry the
weight in Marxs theories of the end of capitalism. See Petith (2002) for a summary
of these theories.
5 Marx explains that the fall in the rate of pro6t is due to the technical choices
of the 6rms and "Nothing is more absurd, for this reason, than to explain the fall
in the rate of pro6t by a rise in the rate of wages, although this may be the case
by way of an exception." (1984, p.240). A bit further along (on p.256) he explains
this exception:"...the competitive struggle (among capitalists) is accompanied by a
temporary rise in wages and a resultant further temporary fall in the rate of pro6t."
   
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fall in the rate of pro6t in industrialized countries that started in the
late sixties and continued into the middle eighties mainly in terms of
rising wages6. The second, which I will refer to as the technical choice
school, attempts to give a general explanation of a long run fall in
the rate of pro6t when this is the result of 6rms technical decisions,
not pressure from the labour market. Although a natural background
assumption would seem to be that of a constant wage, this has been
discarded for two reasons: 6rst, one can 6nd some justi6cation for a
rising wage in Marxs writings, and second, Marxs own argument about
6rms technical choices has been shown by Okishio (1961) to imply a
rising wage. Thus the objective of the technical choice school seems to
have become to explain a long run fall in the rate of pro6t in terms of
the technical choices of 6rms where lack of labour market pressure is
evidenced by a non-rising labour share7 .
There are three distinct contributions to this school. First, Skott
(1992) and Michl (1994) use a monopolistic competition setting and a
Kalecki type wage determination to show that the rate of pro6t will fall
as 6rms adjust slowly to an optimal capital-labour ratio. Here, since
the models have a steady state, the fall in the rate of pro6t comes
to an end. Second, Skillman (1997) has a matching and bargaining
model of the labour market where the individual outcomes depend on
economy wide determined outside options. In the presence of capital
using labour saving innovations, 6rms make technical choices that are
pro6t maximizing at the old outside options but change these in a way
that the labour share remains constant and the rate of pro6t falls.
Here there is no natural end to the fall in the rate of pro6t. Finally
Dummnil and Lmvy, in a sequence of papers culminating in (2003) have
a model with a steady state in which the share of labour is constant
and the rate of pro6t falls. The model has an endogenous labour supply,
a link between the rates of growth of employment and the wage, and
an induced innovation mechanism in which the factor shares determine
the rates of change of the input coehcients. Their contributions are
notable because they span the two lines of thought: In The Economics
of the Pro6t Rate (1993, chapter 15) they explain the post 1965 fall in
the rate of pro6t in terms of an early version of the model and, in the
latest version, primarily thanks to the induced innovation mechanism,
they manage to generate all of the historical tendencies.
The present paper belongs to the technical choice school since the
assumption of an in6nitely elastic labour supply means that labour
6 These writings are surveyed in Howard and King (1992, chapter 16). A recent
contribution which contains a critical survey is Brenner (1998).
7 See Dume^nil and Le^vy (2003, p.206) for a detailed justi6cation of this in terms
of Marxs writings.
   
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market pressure is absent. In this area, its contribution is to show that
by adding land, the historical tendencies can be generated without
having a rising wage. This is important both for understanding what
causes a falling rate of pro6t and for the coherence of Marxs overall
view. First one can take the labour market assumption as an extreme
case where there is no pressure on pro6ts from this quarter. This means
that when we observe a falling rate of pro6t (as in the period that
started in the late sixties), it is perfectly possible that it may have
little to do with a rising wage. Second, the historical tendencies are
important, not for themselves but because of the roles they played in
Marxs various accounts of the end of capitalism. Many of these stories
involve the miserable conditions of the workers. For example, the falling
rate of pro6t causes the capitalists to increase pressure on the workers,
which, in turn, occasions a rise in social coniict. But, as this example
makes clear, the force of these accounts is much weakened if they are
set in the context of rising wages. Thus the importance here is that the
present paper shows how the historical tendencies can be generated
without, at the same time, calling into doubt their raison dntre.
The Dummnil-Lmvy induced innovation mechanism has a paradoxical
relation to the present paper that can be illustrated by looking at Foley
(2003). Foley has a model that is very similar to the one of this paper
with output produced by land and a capital-labour aggregate and an
elasticity of substitution less than one. Yet the model converges to
a steady state with a constant positive rate of pro6t. This seems to
contradict the result of the present paper; what happened? Foley incor-
porates a version of the Dummnil-Lmvy induced innovation mechanism
in his model. This, in turn, implies that the rate of capital augmenting
technical progress approaches zero8 so that one of the two assumptions
of the present model is violated. The paradox is that if one wants to
generate the historical tendencies as is done in the present model, one
has to deny the validity of just the induced innovation mechanism that
was responsible for them in the Dummnil-Lmvy model.
8 This is a simpli6cation: there are two distinct mechanisms, and Foley has two
versions. The 6rst mechanism is associated with Kennedy (1964), involves the rates
of factor augmenting technical progress, and is set in the context of a Solow growth
model. Drandakis and Phelps (1966) showed that this implies that the rate of capital
augmenting technical progress approaches zero. The Dume^nil-Le^vy mechanism in-
volves rates of change of the input coehcients and is set in the context of a classical
6xed coehcient model. In one of Dume^nil and Le^vys cases the change in the capital
input coehcient approaches zero. Foley has a classical and a neoclassical version.
In both of these, if land is not considered a free good but is priced at its marginal
product, then the rate of capital augmenting technical progress or the rate of change
of the capital input coehcient approaches zero and the rate of pro6t approaches a
positive constant.
   
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
This generates a single non-autonomous digerential equation in the
aggregate-land ratio. The asymptotic form of this equation is solved
and the main result is deduced from this solution. Section 3 provides
an intuitive explanation of the main result. Finally Section 4 shows that
the path generated by the asymptotic form approaches that generated
by the original digerential equation.
   
There are two factors of production, each measured in egective units:
Land, !  !" where the quantity of physical units ! is set equal
to 1, #   is the rate of land augmenting technical progress and $ is
time; and a Cobb-Douglas capital-labour aggregate %  &'",
where & and ' are capital and labor in physical units, ( is a constant
 ) ( )  and *   is the rate of aggregate augmenting technical
progress9. +  %,! is the aggregate-land ratio in terms of egective
units:
+  &'"- (1)
There is a single good, output . is produced by a CES production
function in ! and %, .  /%   /!  where  ) / ) 
is a constant and the elasticity of substitution between ! and % is
0   1  2  - Bringing ! outside the brackets gives
.  3+!"1 3+  4+
4  +


1 !  1 (2)
where 4  ,  /

 and 4  /4- 3+ is the ratio of output to
land in egective units which depends on +.
The supply of labour is in6nitely elastic at the subsistence wage 5.
The demand, and thus the quantity of labour, is determined so that
the marginal product of labour is equal to the wage. The marginal
product of the aggregate is 3 + (3   63,6+) and +" is its quantity,
so +3 +" is the payment it receives. Because the aggregate is Cobb-
Douglas, labour receives  ( of this payment. Thus
' 
 (
5
+3 +" 
 (
5
44+
4  +
 

"- (3)
9 Since the aggregate is Cobb-Douglas, it can be thought of as capital augmenting.
   
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From (1) and (3)
&  +

'
 !
 "
!


 
 (
(
44
 !

+
4  +


 "
 (4)
where 7   8  if 2 8  and 9 

 8  if * 8 - Thus ' and
& are given as functions of + and $ .
Capitalists own both the stock of capital and the land. They receive
the output, pay the wage to the workers and get capital gains on the
land, :!1 where : is the price of land in physical units and :  6:,6$.
It is assumed that they save their entire income 10. Thus savings are
. 5' :! . The change in wealth is & :! . Setting the two equal
gives
&  .  5'- (5)
Thus the assumption that capitalists save all eliminates capital gains
and allows the model to be solved without taking the path of the price
of land into account.11
The model reduces to a non-autonomous digerential equation in +.
From (1)
+  ( &   (' *  # (6)
where +  +,+ and so on. From (3)
'  # 
4  2+
4  +
+- (7)
From (2), (3) and (5), & is a function of + and $. Dividing this expres-
sion by (4) to get & gives
&  4


 4
!

 
 (
5

!

+  (4
+  4


 


"- (8)
10 One might object that the saving behavior of capitalists should be determined
by intertemporal optimization. There are two questions: what is the egect of con-
tinued saving on the rate of pro6t, and what is the egect of the temporal pattern of
the pro6t rate on saving? This paper seeks to answer the 6rst question only.
11 Once one has solved the model for the path of , one can use the condition
that the rates of return on land and physical capital must be equal (equation 16
below) to solve for the path of the price of land. This has the pecularity that the
price of land becomes negative in 6nite time. The model can be made consistent by
assuming that the world ends in 6nite time and then choosing the initial price of
land so that land has zero price as the world ends. The theorem of this paper is then
stated in terms of having the time the world ends approach in6nity. This is set out
in detail in Petith (2005). It beyond the scope of the present paper to explore this
issue in depth.
   
Page 9 of 20 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
10
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6) gives
+  ; +" <+ with +$  % 8  (9)
where
; +  =7+
  (4
4  +

 4  7+
+1
<+  9 # 4  +

4  7+
+1
=  44

 


7

 (
5

!
 1
and it is supposed that the initial value of + is positive.
Let +$ be the continuous solution to (9) 12. Lemma 1 gives some
of its characteristics,
LEMMA 1. :f + is a continuous solution to <9> and +$ 8 1 then
i> +$ 8  for $  $ )  and if in addition * 8 1 then ii> +$ is
unbounded for $  $  -
Proof. Cirst note that +$ 8  for $  $ ) - Suppose +$   for
some 6nite value of $. Let $ be the 6rst such value. Fhen +$  1
$  $  $- Fhis means that ; +,+ and <+,+ are bounded belo9 on
this domain and there is an > such that
; +$
+$
" 
<+$
+$
8 >1 $  $  $
so that +$ 8 >+$ on this domain. :ntegrating from $ to $ and using
both sides of the inequality as exponents gives
+$ 8 +$"" 8 1
contradiction.
Suppose +$ ) + for $  $  . Crom the continuity of +$,
+$  , $  $  . Fhus there is an ;8  and < such that
; +$,+$ 8 ; and <+$,+$ 8 < for $  $  . Since * 8 
implies 9 8 , there exists $ and a ? 8  such that

+$  ; +$" <+$ 8

;" <

+$ 8 ?+$
for $ 8 $. :ntegrating as above,
+$ 8 +$"
#
9hich contradicts the supposed bound on +$. !
12 See Petith (2002) for a proof of the existence and uniqueness of  on  
   
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It is instructive to consider what happens to (9) as +   when
2 8 . De6ne ; + and <+ by
; + 
=
+
; + and <+ 
9 #
7
+ <+- (10)
When 2 8  these functions satisfy


; +  

<+  - (11)
Consider the equation that arises when the asymptotic values of these
functions are substituted into (9) :13
+ 
="
+

9 #
7
+1 with +@   %- (12)
In order to determine the solution to (12), substitute the function A$
for +$ with A$  =7 

 - The function A$ satis6es the following
digerential equation, A  A#  A1 which can be easily integrated,
A$  
! - Thus, the solutions of (12) can be determined.
+$ =1 #1 @1% 

=7
#
" B=1 #1 @1%"
 

(13)
in which the constant B=1 #1 @1% is determined by the initial condi-
tion %  +@  =1 #1 @1% Also the function +$ can be de6ned whose
asymptotic behavior is identical to that of +$ when $ tends to in6nity:
+$  =7
#
"

 - (14)
It would seem likely that the solution to (9), +$1 would tend to +$
as $. Indeed this is the case as will be shown below. This is stated
as Lemma 2.
LEMMA 2. Let 2 8  and * 8 1 then

 +$ +$  -
The elements of the historical tendencies may now be de6ned. C 
&,' is the capital-labour ratio and D    is the share of income
13 It is convenient to have two meanings for . Previously it was the capital-labour
aggregate. Here is it the value that  assumes when    . The meaning of 
will be indicated each time it is used.
   
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received by the capitalists. Next consider the rate of pro6t. Since capi-
talists share of the income of the aggregate is (, as in the justi6cation
of (3),
E&  (+3 +" (15)
where E is the marginal product of capital. The rate of pro6t F is
de6ned as total capitalist income divided by the value of factors of
production owned by the capitalists:
F  .  5'
:!
&  :!
-
Since capitalists hold both capital and land, the rate of return on both
of these assets, when calculated in terms of the good, must be the same:
E 

 
:
:
- (16)
It is easily shown that (16) implies that F  E . Thus from this point
on E will be taken as the rate of pro6t. From (15) E  (+3 +",&-
The result of the paper can now be proved. It states that as $
approaches in6nity, the capital-labour ratio approaches in6nity, the
capitalist share approaches one, and the rate of pro6t approaches zero.
THEOREM 3. Let 2 8  and * 8 - Fhen C$  1 D$  1 and
E$  as $-
Proof. Let '$ and &$ be the values of & and ' derived from <3>,
<4> and the function +$. Crom <3> and <15>
E$ 
5(
 (

C$
- (17)
Crom <2> and <3>
D$ 
(4+$
  
4+$  
-
Crom <3> and <4>
C$  4 4  +$


 "
9here 4   

 44
 
 . Fhus, since +$   as $   from
Lemma 2,
C$ 4+$" =D $-
Let 6$ be the distance bet9een +$ and +$ that is
6$  +$ =7
#
"
   
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9here 6$  as $ from Lemma 2. Fhen
C$ 4


=7
#
"



 6$

"
 4


=7
#
"



 6$"
 



 4=7
#


 "



=D $- (18)
Fhus since 2 8  and since * 8  implies 9 8 1 C$   as
$- Fhus E$  as $- Cinally, since by Lemma 2 +$
as $, 2 8  means that D$  as $- !
      
In this description land and the aggregate are always expressed in egec-
tive units while labour and capital are in physical units. The 6rst step
is to understand why the capital-labour aggregate in egective units, %,
grows faster than land, ! , in the same units. It must do this in order
to keep the marginal product of labour constant because the aggregate
admits technical progress. This can be seen as follows: suppose the
rate of growth of the aggregate was less than or equal to that of land,%  #  #-
a. .  # by constant returns to scale and, since there is a con-
stant savings ratio, .  & asymptotically so that .  &  #
asymptotically.
b. Since %  (&('*1 '  #  - That is, since capital
is growing at least as fast as the aggregate, labour must grow more
slowly to compensate for the technical progress.
c. But in this case the marginal product of labour rises both because
the capital to labour ratio increases and the ratio of the aggregate to
land falls. Since this is impossible, the aggregate must grow faster than
land.
To put this in a nutshell: If the aggregate does not grow faster than
land, then capital will grow at least as fast as the aggregate, labour will
grow slower to compensate for the technical progress of the aggregate
and the impossible wage growth will occur.
14 The arguments of this section are only approximate. It is frequently stated that
the rates of growth of the variables approach limits. This is convenient for an intuitive
discussion and may well be the case, but it has not been formally demonstrated. The
problem is that Lemma 2 does not imply that   as 
   
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The second step is to understand why this implies that capital must
grow faster than labour: Since 0 ) , asymptotically, the slowest grow-
ing factor dominates so that .  #- Again asymptotically, because of
the constant savings ratio, &  . - Finally from the condition that the
wage is constant, '  # 2 +1 which can be understood as follows: If +
were constant, then the payment to the aggregate would grow at # and,
since labour receives a constant proportion of this, the labour supply
would have to grow at # to keep the wage 6xed. Since 0 )  the growth
of + will reduce the payment to the aggregate at an asymptotic rate
of 2+ so that the payment to labour grows at #  2+ and the labour
supply must grow at this rate to keep the wage constant. Thus it is
a combination of the relative growth of the aggregate, 0 ) 1 and the
constant wage that forces capital to grow faster than labour.15 .
Finally, what forces drive the historical tendencies? First, the ag-
gregate grows faster than land because of technical progress in the
aggregate. Because of this, with 0 ) , in order to keep the wage
constant labour must grow more slowly than capital. This establishes
that C  . Second, since both the share of capital in the aggregate
and the reward to labour are constant, the faster growth of capital
must be compensated for by a fall in its reward. This establishes that
E  - (Alternatively, the rise in &,' with the marginal product of
labour 6xed forces the marginal product of capital to fall.) Finally, since
0 ) 1 the faster growth of the aggregate forces its share and that of
labour to zero. This establishes that D -
With this detailed heuristic account, the reader may be in danger of
not seeing the forest for the trees. A simpler, less accurate explanation
is the following. Think in terms of a model with only capital and land.
Generally, when one adds factor augmenting technical progress to a
factor that can be accumulated, like capital, the result is explosive
growth in the sense that the rate of growth increases over time. But in
our simpli6ed model, with elasticity less than one, this is counteracted
by the slower growth of land in ehciency units. The result is a balance
between these two forces in which the growth of capital, in ehciency
units, is not explosive but is more rapid than that of land with the
consequence of a continually falling rate of pro6t.
15 With slightly more egort one can see why         Put   
and then the above expression for  into (7).
   
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Cigure 1. Illustration of lemmas 5 and 6
    
This section provides the proof of Lemma 2, but only for the case of
#  9 8 - This will be called Lemma 6. This is the most dihcult
and also the most interesting case since it is the one in which the rate
of technical progress in land # can be unboundedly large. The proof
of the other case, #  9  1 is set out in Petith (2002). Lemma 6
states that +$, the solution to (9), approaches +$, given by (14), as
$- The proof proceeds in two steps and can be read from 6gure 1.
Lemma 5 uses Chaplygins theorem to establish that + lies between two
bounding functions + and + - Then Lemma 6 shows that these
two bounding functions eventually enter an G tube that surrounds +;
thus + is asymptotically equivalent to +-
First Chaplygins theorem is stated:
THEOREM 4. 16 Let +$ be the solution to the equation +  H+1 $1
+@   %1 and let +$ and + $ be t9o bounding functions 9ith
+ @   + @   %- :f the diQerential inequalities
+ $ H+ $1 $ ) 
16 See Mikhlin and Smolitskiy (1967, pp. 9-12) or pwillinger (1989, pp. 388-391).
   
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+ $ H+ $1 $ 8 
hold for $ 8 @ , then
+ $ ) +$ ) + $
for all $ 8 @-
Next the bounding functions are constructed by taking the solutions
to modi6ed forms of (12). First modify( 12) as
+ 
=
+
" I
9 #
7
+ 
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+1 +@   % (19)
where #  #I   I9- Then take + $ as the solution to this
equation with # in (13) replaced by #- Next modify (12) as
+  !
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+ 
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+1 +@   % (20)
where =  != and #  #!  !9- Then take + $ as the
solution to this equation with = and # in (13) replaced by = and # .
Now Lemma 5 may be proved.
LEMMA 5. Let +$ be the solution to <9>, let 2 8 1 and * 8  and
taRe 9 # ) - Cor any + there exists a @ such that +@  8 + and
+ $ ) +$ ) + $1 $ 8 @
9here
+ $  +$ =1 #1 %@ 1 @ 1 I  <+@ , ; +@ 
and
+ $  +$ = 1 # 1 +@ 1 @ 1 !  <+@ -
Proof. Fhe properties of the bounding functions depend on those of ; +
and <+- :t is clear that
<+, ; + 8 1 (21)
and that there exists an + such that
; + ) 1 <+ )  and  <+, ; + )  for + 8 +- (22)
Next a condition on the derivatives of + and + is given. Cor
the given + choose @ so that +@  8 +, so that +@  8 + of <22> and
   
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so that +@  8 - Fhis is possible since, by Lemma 1 +$ is unbounded
above. Since +@  8 , 9riting <9> in terms of ; + and <+ gives
=
+
" ; + 
9 #
7
+ <+  +@  8 1 +  +@ 1 (23)
by <23>

+ @  
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+
<+
; +
8 1 +  + @ 
and 6nally

+ $ 8 1 $  @- (24)
Fhe last inequality follo9s by diQerentiating <13> 9ith respect to time
to get

+$ 

7
+


=7
#
"

9 #  9B-"

- (25)
Teplacing # 9ith # sho9s that

+ is either positive <if #9B- 8
> or increasing in $-
Also

+ @   <+
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+
8 <+
; +
<+
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+ 8 1 for +  + @ 
9here the 6rst inequality follo9s from <21> and the second from <23>,
and, as above, from <25>

+ $ 8 1 $  @- (26)
Cinally it is sho9n that the conditions of ChaplyginVs theorem are
satis6ed.
+ @   +@   + @ 
by construction.
+ $ 8 + @ 1 + $ 8 + @ 1 $ 8 @ (27)
by <24> and <26>.

+ $ 
=
+
" I
9 #
7
+ ) 
=
+
" 
<+
; +
9 #
7
+ ; +

=
+
" ; + 
9 #
7
+ <+1 for +  + $1 $ 8 @
   
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by <11>, <21>, <22>, and <27>.

+ $  !
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+ 8 
; +
<+
=
+
" 
9 #
7
+ <+

=
+
" ; + 
9 #
7
+ <+ for +  + $1 $ 8 @
by <21>, <22> and <27>. Fhis completes the proof. !
Finally Lemma 6 is proved for the case of 9 # ) -
LEMMA 6. Let +$ be the solution to <9>, let 2 8  and * 8  and
taRe 9 # ) - Fhen

 +$ +$  -
Proof. Choose G arbitrary but 9ith G ) 1 G ) 
 

 - :t must be sho9n
that there is a @ such that
 G+$ ) +$ )   G+$1 $ 8 @-
Choose + large enough so that, for the @ given by Lemma 5,
<+
; +
)  
G,
 
1 <+ )  




  
1 for +  +@ - (28)
No9 apply Lemma 5. Fhe proof is completed by sho9ing that there
exists a @ such that
 G+$ ) + $1 + $ )   G+$1 $ 8 @-
Choose @ 8 @ so that
 G, )  "B=1 #1 +@ 1 @ 1 $ 8 @-
<28>, and the de6nitions of I and # imply

  G,
)

I I



-
 G )  G ) 
  G,
 G, ) 
#,#
 G,1
 G=7
#
" )
=7
#
" "B=1 #1 +@ 1 @ 1
 G+$ ) + $1 for $ 8 @-
   
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Choose @ 8 @ such that
 " B= 1 # 1 +@ 1 @  )   G,1 for $ 8 @-
<28> and the de6nition of ! imply
!
!  !
)   G,-
Fhis and the de6nitions of = and # give
=
#
)
=
#
  G,-
=7
#
" " B= 1 # 1 +@ 1 @  ) =7
#
"  G,
)
=7
#
"  G )
=7
#
"  G1 $ 8 @
+ $ )   G+$1 $ 8 @-
Fhe proof is completed by taRing @  !=+@1 @- !
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